Summary: Plaintiff sought judicial review of SSA's denial of disability benefits. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the ALJ's finding that plaintiff's subjective complaints of low back pain were not fully credible. The court recognizes that although Mr. Halvorson's limitations did not allow him to perform the full range of light work, the ALJ's finding that he had the capacity to perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy such as a parking attendant, security guard, and light assembler was supported by substantial evidence. Finally, the additional evidence submitted by the plaintiff to the Appeals Council was consistent with the ALJ's findings and would not have changed his decision. SSA's decision was affirmed.
Case Name: Linda Halvorson v. SSA
Case Number: A3-99-57
Docket Number: 14
Date Filed: 8/7/00
Nature of Suit: 865
Linda Halvorson on behalf of Mark Halvorson,
Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security,
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) ) ) ) ) Civil No. A3-99-57 ) ) ) ) |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Linda Halvorson initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denying her husband Mark Halvorson's (deceased) application for disability insurance benefits based under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433. Before the court are both parties' motions for summary judgment. (Doc. # 10, 12) For the reasons articulated in this memorandum, the magistrate judge recommends to the court that the Commissioner's motion be granted and his final decision affirmed.
Mark Halvorson submitted an application for disability insurance benefits with a protective filing date of April 24, 1997. (Tr. at 104) Mr. Halvorson alleged that he had been disabled since April 1, 1991, due to a lower back injury. (Tr. at 101-104, 138) His disability insured status expired on June 30, 1996. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied Mr. Halvorson's application initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. at 88-98) Mr. Halvorson then timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ"). (Tr. at 97) Following the administrative hearing, the ALJ found that Mr. Halvorson had a "severe degenerative disk and degenerative joint disease of the lumbosacral spine and right knee sprain and osteoarthritis but he did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4." (Tr. at 25) Therefore, the ALJ determined that Mr. Halvorson "was not under a 'disability' as defined in the Social Security Act at any time through June 30, 1996, the date the claimant's disability insured status expired." (Tr. at 27)
Mr. Halvorson died on January 5, 1998, approximately one month following the administrative hearing and before the ALJ's decision. (Tr. at 12) Mr. Halvorson's wife, plaintiff Linda Halvorson, timely filed a request for review of the ALJ's decision with the Appeals Council. (Tr. at 7) The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision, thus ratifying the ALJ's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. at 4)
Upon review of the pleadings and transcript of the record, the court can affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the Commissioner, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). To affirm the Commissioner's decision, the court must find that it is supported by substantial evidence appearing in the record as a whole. See id.; Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1184 (8th Cir. 1989). "Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough so that a reasonable mind might find it adequate to support the conclusion." Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 1992); Consolidated Edison Co., et al. v. National Labor Relations Bd., et al., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). The review of the record is more than a search for evidence supporting the Commissioner's decision; the court must also take into account matters that detract from the ALJ's findings and apply a balancing test to weigh evidence which is contradictory. Kirby v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1323, 1326 (8th Cir. 1991); Sobania v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 879 F.2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1989).
Under the Social Security Act, an individual is "disabled" if he or she is "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity (1)
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to . . . last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months . . .." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 1997). The impairment(s) must be so severe that the applicant is "not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B) (Supp. 1997).
Claims of disability are evaluated using a five-step sequential review. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) (1997). (2) The first step is to determine whether the applicant is engaged in substantial gainful employment. If the applicant is so engaged, there is no disability. If, however, the applicant is not engaged in substantial gainful employment, the second step is to consider whether the applicant has an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limit his or her ability to perform basic work activities. (3) If there is no limiting effect, the applicant is not disabled. But, if the applicant is significantly limited by his or her impairment(s), the third step is to determine whether the impairments meet or equal a listed impairment. If the impairments do meet or equal a listed impairment, the applicant is disabled. The fourth step is to determine how the impairments affect the applicant's ability to perform past relevant work. The applicant is not disabled if he or she is still able to perform past relevant work. Finally, the fifth step is to determine whether the applicant can perform other work. If the applicant cannot perform other work, the applicant is disabled.
The applicant bears the burden of proving disability. Clark v. Shalala, 28 F.3d 828, 830 (8th Cir. 1994). "However, if the claimant can demonstrate that []he is unable to do past relevant work, and thereby reaches the fifth step in the process, the burden shifts to the [Commissioner], who must show that substantial gainful activity exists in the national economy which the claimant can perform." Id.
In the instant case, the ALJ determined that although Mr. Halvorson's limitations did not allow him to perform the full range of light work, he had the capacity to perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy such as a parking attendant, security guard, and light assembler. (Tr. at 26) Thus, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled at the fifth and final step in the evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's findings are not supported by substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence requires only that a reasonable mind might find the evidence adequate to support the conclusion. Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d at 838. In this instance it appears the ALJ looked at the administrative record as a whole. He considered both the objective and subjective evidence submitted and found that Mr. Halvorson's subjective complaints of pain coupled with the objective evidence and Mr. Halvorson's reports of his daily living activity did not support a finding of disability. Specifically the ALJ noted that Mr. Halvorson's allegation that he had severe and persistent pain from 1991 through 1996 was not consistent with "the level of clinical attention [he sought] during this time period" or his daily activities during the time in question. (Tr. at 24)
When evaluating a disability claim based on pain, an ALJ must consider the claimant's subjective complaints under the Polaski factors. (4) Siemers v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 299, 301 (8th Cir. 1995); Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). Under Polaski, the ALJ must consider all evidence presented related to plaintiff's subjective complaints in determining whether such complaints are credible evidence of a disability. Id. at 1322. Furthermore, "'before an ALJ may reject a claimant's subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ must make express credibility determinations'" and "detail[] his reasons for discrediting the testimony." Ricketts v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 902 F.2d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 1990); Douthit v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 508, 509 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting Brock v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 791 F.2d 112, 114 (8th Cir. 1986)).
Mr. Halvorson reported that he was in too much pain to continue farming, yet his work activity reports indicate that he did seasonal farm labor in 1994, 1995, and 1998. (Tr. at 110, 114) In May of 1995 Mr. Halvorson stepped off his tractor and inverted his right knee causing swelling and pain. (Tr. at 230) In February of 1997 Mr. Halvorson fell off his tractor and went to MeritCare for treatment of his injury. (Tr. at 171) In April of 1997 Mr. Halvorson had flare-up pain caused by attempting to shovel ice and snow. (Tr. at 190) This type of activity is not consistent with an individual who is experiencing chronic and severe pain that would render the individual disabled. Mr. Halvorson's testimony at the administrative hearing lacked credibility.
The ALJ was also troubled by the limited amount of medical treatment sought by Mr. Halvorson for his pain. The ALJ points out that Mr. Halvorson's disability onset date was April 1991, yet the first clinical record relevant to the period of disability is dated May 1995. (Tr. at 22) The ALJ concluded that the time frame in which the medical attention commenced "is not consistent with severe and persistent pain at all times since April 1991." (Tr. at 22) The undersigned agrees. The record suggests that Mr. Halvorson was not so wrought with pain that he could not function. The ALJ in this case properly evaluated Mr. Halvorson's claim of disabling pain under the Polaski factors. The ALJ's findings with respect to Mr. Halvorson's credibility are supported by substantial evidence contained in the record as a whole.
Plaintiff also asserts the ALJ failed to follow the regulations and mandated procedures for evaluation of an individual with a combination of exertional and non-exertional impairments. Non-exertional limitations are those limitations affecting one's ability to meet the demands of his or her job other than the strength demand, which is considered an exertional limitation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569(c)(1). Non-exertional limitations include, but are not limited to, difficulty in functioning due to depression and/or difficulty in performing tasks such as reaching, handling, stooping, climbing, crawling, or crouching. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a(c)(I) and (vi). The regulation discussing the evaluation of exertional and non-exertional limitations can be found at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569(d) and provides in relevant part that should an individual have both exertional and non-exertional limitations, "[the Social Security Administration] will not directly apply the rules in appendix 2 unless there is a rule that directs a conclusion that you are disabled based upon your strength limitations; otherwise the rules provide a framework to guide our decision."
Mr. Halvorson's functional capacity evaluation, which is dated July 1997, indicates that he is able to occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (Tr. at 183) The ALJ did consider the functional limitations of Mr. Halvorson, and concluded the record contained contradictions. Mr. Halvorson indicated that he had the capacity to walk only one block, yet a notation by a physical therapist indicates that Mr. Halvorson could walk six blocks. (Tr. at 238) In that same notation the physical therapist indicates that Mr. Halvorson reported painting a lawn tractor for approximately one hour. (Tr. At 238) Further Mr. Halvorson engaged in seasonal farm labor in 1994 through 1996, though he alleged that he was in too much pain to work. (Tr. at 110, 114) Mr. Halvorson's self-report of his non-exertional limitations are not supported by objective evidence and in fact are contradicted by statements Mr. Halvorson made to medical personnel. Therefore, the court concludes that the ALJ properly evaluated plaintiff's exertional and non-exertional limitations.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the Appeals Council failed to follow the regulations for evaluating new and material evidence. The regulation provides:
If new and material evidence is submitted, the Appeals Council shall consider the additional evidence only where it relates to the period on or before the date of the administrative law judge hearing decision. The Appeals Council shall evaluate the entire record including the new and material evidence submitted if it relates to the period on or before the date of the administrative law judge decision. It will then review the case if it finds that the administrative law judge's action, findings, or conclusion is contrary to the weight of the evidence currently of record.
20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b). The Appeals Council must review evidence "if the additional evidence is (a) new, (b) material, and (c) relates to the period on or before the date of the ALJ's decision." Williams v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 214, 216-217 (8th Cir. 1990). The question of whether evidence is new, material, and related to the relevant period is reviewed de novo. Id. at 216.
In this instance the new evidence plaintiff refers to consists of photocopied pages from the "Textbook of Pain" (Tr. at 244-246), an excerpt from "Mayo Clinic Practice of Cardiology" (Tr. at 247-250), and a February 27, 1998 letter from Dr. Turner. (Tr. at 250) Mr. Halvorson died of a myocardial infarction on January 5, 1998, approximately one month after the administrative hearing. There is no objective evidence in the record that would indicate that Mr. Halvorson suffered from a cardiac impairment prior to June 30, 1996, the day his insured status expired. Mr. Halvorson's physician, Dr. Turner, submitted a letter to Mr. Halvorson's attorney which states only that Mr. Halvorson's pain in combination with his overall physical health could contribute to the cardiac infarction that caused his death. This vague, speculative opinion coupled with some copies out of medical texts do not rise to the level of material evidence. Further Mr. Halvorson's heart condition occurred approximately 18 months after the expiration of his insured status, well after the relevant insured time period. Upon review of the record, the undersigned finds that the additional evidence contained in the transcript reveals no new information about Mr. Halvorson's condition. Consequently, there is no need to remand the case to the Appeals Council for consideration of the additional evidence.
In sum, the ALJ properly evaluated Mr. Halvorson's complaints of disabling pain under the Polaski factors and adequately explained his decision. Furthermore, substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ's finding that Mr. Halvorson's complaints of disabling pain were not fully credible. Although the record indicates that Mr. Halvorson did have pain in his back and right knee and at times his pain was severe, the evidence does not support Mr. Halvorson's allegations of constant, severe pain that rendered him disabled. Therefore, since the ALJ's credibility determination was properly evaluated and based on substantial evidence, it must be affirmed. See Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).
The vocational expert's testimony along with Mr. Halvorson's testimony, his medical records, age, education and work history, together with the ALJ's finding that Mr. Halvorson's allegations of pain were not fully credible, provided substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determination that Mr. Halvorson retained the physical capacity to perform a significant number of jobs in the light range.
III. Conclusion
Substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the ALJ's finding that Mr. Halvorson's subjective complaints of disabling pain were not fully credible. The ALJ's finding that Mr. Halvorson retained the residual functional capacity to do substantial gainful activity is also supported by the record. Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #10) be DENIED.
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #12) be GRANTED.
Judgment should be entered affirming the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(E)(4), any party may object to this recommendation within ten (10) days after being served with a copy thereof.
Dated this ____ day of August, 2000.
Karen K. Klein
United States Magistrate Judge
2. If the Commissioner finds that the applicant is either disabled or not disabled at any point in the review, the Commissioner does not continue the review.
3. "Basic work activities" are defined as "the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs," including:
(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;
(2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;
(3) Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;
(4) Use of judgment;
(5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and
(6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b) (1997).
4. The Polaski factors include the claimant's prior work record and observations of third parties,
including physicians, related to: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency and intensity of the
pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness and side
effects of medication; and (5) functional limitations. Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.