Summary: Plaintiffs sued the EPA as parens patriae for the people of the state of North Dakota, alleging federal regulations violated the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). The Court dismissed the complaint, holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to proceed as parens patria.

Case Name: ND Attorney General v. USEPA

Case Number: A3-00-109

Docket Number: 13

Date Filed: 6/20/01

Nature of Suit: 893

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA

SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

    Before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss, arguing the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case and that the claims are time barred (doc. # 8). Plaintiffs resist the motion (doc. # 11). As set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.

I.  Background

    The Court will not address the factual background of the case in great detail, as this motion concerns a jurisdictional motion. Briefly, the case involves disagreement over application of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) to North Dakota farmers who wish to purchase a pesticide in Canada and bring it to North Dakota for use on their crops. In short, defendants have prohibited North Dakota farmers from doing so, and plaintiffs assert this decision misinterprets and misapplies FIFRA.

    The only additional issue which requires explication is precisely who the plaintiffs of the suit are. Initially, one of the plaintiffs was the North Dakota Department of Agriculture. However, plaintiffs have stipulated in their motion papers that the this party should be dismissed. Therefore, the only plaintiff remaining is “Wayne Stenehjem, Attorney General for the State of North Dakota, on behalf of the People of the State of North Dakota.” In other words, the sole plaintiff is North Dakota’s Attorney General, suing as parens patriae for the people of North Dakota. This fact is crucial to resolution of the case.

II. Analysis

    The EPA’s essential argument is that a state may not sue the federal government as parens patriae for its citizens, because the federal government is presumed to represent the rights of American citizens. See generally Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982). Thus, according to the EPA, plaintiffs lack standing to pursue these claims in the case’s current posture, depriving this Court of jurisdiction. The rule upon which defendant relies was most famously articulated in a footnote in a Supreme Court opinion: “A State does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal Government.” Id. The Supreme Court in turn relied upon one of its earlier opinions for support of this proposition:

While the State, under some circumstances, may sue in that capacity for the protection of its citizens, it is no part of its duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations with the Federal Government. In that field it is the United States, and not the State, which represents them as parens patriae.

    The Court did not actually enforce this rule in Alfred L. Snapp, since the state in that case was suing private defendants as parens patriae, not the United States government. See 458 U.S. at 610 n.16. Nevertheless, many federal circuits have cited it as authority for the premise that a state lacks standing to sue the federal government as parens patriae for its citizens. See, e.g., Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 338 n.7 (1st Cir. 2000); Wyoming v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 877, 883 (10th Cir. 1992); Nevada v. Burdford, 918 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1990); Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.3d 668, 678-81 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

    Most importantly, however, the Eighth Circuit adopted and applied this rule in State of Iowa v. Block, 771 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1985). In Block, the Eight Circuit held that Iowa could not sue as parens patriae to force the federal government to declare portions of Iowa a disaster area, triggering entitlement to funds. Id. at 348. After rejecting that Iowa had standing on its own behalf - which North Dakota does not argue - the court rejected parens patriae standing. Id. at 354-55.

     In so doing, the court began by noting that “the most recent and well-reasoned discussions of this type of suit disallow its use against the federal government and reserve parens patriae instead for the state to vindicate the rights of its citizens against private defendants.” Id. at 354. The court then cited the Alfred L. Snapp footnote, describing it as “disallow[ing] state suits against the federal government on a parens patriae theory.” Id. Finally, the court concluded by explaining that:

Although we recognize the considerable importance that the State of Iowa and its citizens place on the continued vitality of agriculture in the state's economy, we cannot allow the State to proceed as parens patriae in this case. To do so would intrude on the sovereignty of the federal government and ignore important considerations of our federalist system.

Block, 771 F.2d at 355. In conjunction with the Supreme Court’s statements on the issue and the unanimous conclusions of other circuits, this directive by the Eighth Circuit requires this Court to conclude that plaintiffs cannot proceed against the federal government as parens patriae. Thus, they lack standing, and the Court lacks jurisdiction over the case.

    This conclusion is not altered by plaintiffs’ attempts to distinguish the general rule from the case at bar. Plaintiffs seek to establish an exception to the general rule which would allow parens patriae when a state seeks to enforce federal rights on behalf of its citizens, even if it is barred when a state seeks to avoid the effects of federal law. For this proposition, plaintiffs cite a number of district court cases. See generally Puerto Rico Pub. Hous. Admin. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 59 F.Supp. 2d 310, 326 (D. P.R. 1999); Kansas v. United States, 748 F.Supp. 797, 802 (D. Kan. 1990). However, the Court concludes that a number of reasons prevent it from applying such a distinction, even assuming one exists, here.

    First, none of the cases plaintiffs cite are from the Eighth Circuit. Contrarily, the Block opinion, discussed above, articulates in broad terms a prohibition on all parens patriae suits brought by a state against the federal government. See Block, 771 F.2d at 354-55. Thus, assuming plaintiffs’ interpretation of the cases it cites is correct, the theory runs headlong into a contrary and binding Eighth Circuit case.

    Moreover, the viability of many of the cases plaintiff cites must be questioned. For example, plaintiff cites Kansas v. United States, 748 F.Supp. 797, a 1990 District of Kansas case. However, in Wyoming v Lujan, the Tenth Circuit in 1992 described the rule against parens patriae suits in language as broad as the Eighth Circuit’s in Block. See 969 F.2d 887, 883 (citing Alfred L. Snapp). The same is true of Washington Utils. & Trans. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 513 F.2d 1142, (9th Cir. 1975), which the Ninth Circuit explicitly overruled in 1990. See Burford, 918 F.2d at 858. Thus, the number of viable cases articulating and applying the exception plaintiffs wish to establish are few.

    Finally, it is not clear this case would fit into such an exception. The Tenth Circuit has explained that "generalized grievance that the [government] is not acting in a way in which [the State] maintains is in accordance with federal laws ... is insufficient to demonstrate standing." Lujan, 969 F.2d at 883 (quoting Burford, 918 F.2d at 857). This is precisely the case here. North Dakota is seeking to enforce federal laws, as it argues, but it seeks to do so by proving that the method in which the federal government is enforcing them is unlawful. This was, essentially, the situation is Block, 771 F.2d at 348, and the Court is thus forced to conclude that North Dakota cannot pursue its claims as parens patriae for the people of North Dakota.

III. Conclusion

    As set forth above, the Court concludes that plaintiffs lack standing to proceed in this case, and thus the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court need not address whether plaintiff’s claims are time barred. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

 Dated this _____ day of June, 2001,

RODNEY S. WEBB, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT