Summary:       The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction in state court on charges of murder, obstruction of a government function, and tampering with evidence. The Court dismissed the petition, finding that it was barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s one-year statute of limitations.

Case Name: Steinbach v. Schuetzle

Case Number: A1-03-44

Docket Number: 8

Date Filed: 6/23/03

Nature of Suit: 530

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA

SOUTHWESTERN DIVISION
 

            Before the Court is Petitioner Mark Allen Steinbach’s Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. In May 1997, the Petitioner (“Steinbach”) was convicted in state court on charges of murder, physical obstruction of a government function, and tampering with physical evidence. Steinbach is currently incarcerated in the North Dakota State Penitentiary, where he is serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Steinbach filed his petition for habeas corpus relief with this Court on April 16, 2003. Steinbach subsequently filed an amended petition for habeas corpus relief with this Court on May 21, 2003. For the reasons outlined below, the Court concludes that Steinbach’s petition is untimely.

I.         BACKGROUND

            Mark Steinbach was charged in state court with class AA felony murder and with two class A misdemeanors, namely, physical obstruction of a government function and tampering with physical evidence. In April 1997, a jury found Steinbach guilty of all charges. Steinbach was

subsequently sentenced to one year on each misdemeanor charge, to be served consecutively, and to life imprisonment, without the opportunity of parole, for the murder conviction.

            In May 1997, Steinbach appealed his conviction to the North Dakota Supreme Court, but was unsuccessful. In State v. Steinbach, 575 N.W.2d 193 ((N.D. 1998), the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of convictions and denied Steinbach’s motion for a new trial. In May 1999, Steinbach filed an application for post-conviction relief in state court. His application was dismissed without prejudice in April 2002. In June 2002, Steinbach filed another application for post-conviction relief in state court. The trial court summarily dismissed this application. The North Dakota Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the trial court’s decision in its order dated March 26, 2003. See Steinbach v. State, 658 N.W.2d 355 (N.D. 2003). On April 16, 2003, Steinbach filed his petition for habeas corpus relief with this Court. On May 21, 2003, Steinbach filed an amended petition, asserting eight grounds for relief. 

II.       LEGAL DISCUSSION

            Steinbach’s petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which imposes a one-year statute of limitations for filing federal habeas petitions. See 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). The one-year statute of limitations begins to run on the latest of the following four alternative dates set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1):

            (A)      the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

            (B)      the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

            (C)      the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

            (D)      the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Nothing in Steinbach’s petition renders subsections (B), (C), or (D) applicable to the above-entitled action. Thus, Steinbach’s limitation period is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

            According to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the running of the statute of limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) is triggered by either:

(1)the conclusion of all direct criminal appeals in the state system, followed by either the completion or denial of certiorari proceedings before the United States Supreme Court; or

            (2)       if certiorari was not sought, then by the conclusion of all direct criminal appeals in the state system followed by the expiration of the time allotted for filing a petition for the writ.

Nichols v. Bowersox, 172 F.3d 1068, 1072 (8^th Cir. 1999). In Steinbach’s case, the one-year statute of limitations began to run on April 21, 1998, which is ninety days after the January 21, 1998, order of the North Dakota Supreme Court affirming Steinbach’s conviction. See Beery v. Ault, 312 F.3d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 2002) (the “expiration of time for seeking direct review” must include the 90-day period within which a petitioner may file a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court); Williams v. Bruton, 299 F.3d 981, 982 (8th Cir. 2002); Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 461-62 (8th Cir. 2000); Nichols v. Bowersox, 172 F.3d 1068, 1072. As a result, Steinbach’s one-year limitations period would have expired on April 21, 1999. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). It is clear that Steinbach’s petition filed on April 16, 2003, is untimely.

            The Court is cognizant of the fact that the AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to tolling. See Cross-Bey v. Gammon, 322 F.3d 1012, 1014 (8^th Cir. 2003). The statute itself contains a tolling provision which provides that “the time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review ... is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However, this provision does not apply to the case at hand. It is clear and undisputed that no state court applications for collateral review were pending during the relevant one-year statute of limitations time period. As noted above, Steinbach’s one-year limitation period would have expired on April 21, 1999, which was one year plus ninety (90) days after the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed Steinbach’s conviction on January 21, 1998. Steinbach did not file his first application for post-conviction relief with the state court until May 13, 1999. See Steinbach v. State, 658 N.W.2d 355, 357. As a result, Steinbach’s petition was clearly untimely.

            In addition to the statutory tolling provision, the AEDPA’s statute of limitations may be tolled as a matter of equity. See Cross-Bey v. Gammon, 322 F.3d 1012, 1014 (8^th Cir. 2003). “[E]quitable tolling is proper when there exist extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control that made filing a timely petition impossible or when the respondent's conduct has lulled the petitioner into inaction.” Id. at 1015. “[A]ny invocation of equity to relieve the strict application of a statute of limitations must be guarded and infrequent, lest circumstances of individualized hardship supplant the rules of clearly drafted statutes.” Id. (quoting Flanders v. Graves, 299 F.3d 974, 976 (8^th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 1361, (2003)).

            This case presents no extraordinary circumstances beyond Steinbach’s own conduct that made it impossible for him to file a timely petition. Nowhere in Steinbach’s petition has he even asserted that he was lulled into inaction on account of anyone’s conduct. The Court concludes that equitable tolling is neither appropriate nor warranted in this case. The Petitioner, Mark Steinbach, had more than one year (from January 21, 1998 until April 21, 1999) to take steps to pursue a petition for habeas corpus relief and he failed to do so.

III.      CONCLUSION

            Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Steinbach’s petition for habeas corpus relief is clearly time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). IT IS ORDERED that Steinbach’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody be dismissed with prejudice. The Court certifies that any appeal would be frivolous, could not be taken in good faith, and may not be taken in forma pauperis.

            Dated this ___________ day of June, 2003.

                                                                        ________________________

                                                                        Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge

United States District Court